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Twitter & Privacy

In my view, the second sentence here is the most important. If one posts material viewable by the entire world, the author implicitly licenses anyone to use the content-—in other words, no copyright applies, and the author does not “own” his or her user-generated content. The necessary corollary is that when the whole world can see your stuff, the government does not need permission, let alone a warrant, to look too.

Privacy law was largely created in the pre-Internet age, and new rules are needed to keep up with the ways people communicate today. Much of what occurs online, like blog posting, is intended to be an open declaration to the world, and law enforcement is within its rights to read and act on what is written. Other kinds of communication, particularly in a closed network, may come with an expectation of privacy. If government agents are joining social networks under false pretenses to spy without a court order, for example, that might be crossing a line.

Of course, where a social network allows users to restrict access, to friends or followers, the opposite conclusion holds. For instance, unless Facebook wall posts are made available to “everyone” in the user’s privacy settings, then there remain both legitimate ownership and privacy interests, such that the government can’t monitor that content without both probable cause and a warrant.

#140conf Panel on Social Media Law & Policy

This is a video clip from the panel on Law and Policy for Social Media which I moderated at last week’s 140 Characters Conference in Los Angeles.

The Law of Social Media (Part II)

[Part I of this series of essays can be found at this permalink].

2. Who Owns User-Generated Content?

Who owns user-generated content (UGC) posted to social media sites?  This is but one of the many vexing issues presented by the emerging law of social media, albeit one of great interest to users, corporate subscribers and social networking providers alike. After all, if possession is 9/10 of the law, then the natural, lay reaction to the question of who owns social media UGC is “the Web site, of course.”

That’s not exactly correct, however. One must  differentiate among the various forms of intellectual property (IP) law potentially applicable here.  Copyright, a matter exclusively of federal law, is available for original expressions (with or without registration), but is always subject to “fair use.”  Trademarks and their service mark complements are available for unique names, phrases and logos associated with commercial products and services, but are limited to narrow classes of expression and ordinarily — unlike copyright — must be expressly claimed.  Finally, patents are available for inventions (products, processes and methods), and give the patent holder (a/k/a patentee) the power to prevent anyone else from using the protected invention, but only arise when a patent is officially issued by the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO).

(a)  Social Media and IP Law. Each of these bodies of law, and the respective rights and obligations they create, has a different impact on social media generally.  For instance, Twitter owns a trademark on the company’s name, but was denied registration of a trademark on “Tweet.”  And in a provocative change last February, one eliciting a firestorm of user criticism, Facebook modified its terms of service (ToS) to grant the site a perpetual license on UGC even after a subscriber terminates his/her membership and removes photos and other UGC from their page. These two recent examples illustrate not only that IP law in part depends on the eye of the beholder, but more importantly that even within the social media space, there is no present consensus on just what is protected, what is public domain and what is somewhere in between.

Let’s start with the basics, then.  Copyright cannot be claimed on information, only on expressions.  So the information in a database or software application cannot be copyrighted, but the organization of a database and the actual code (whether in a scripting language or machine code) for a program are considered expressions subject to copyright.  One would not, for instance, violate Microsoft’s copyrights by designing a word processing program that replicated functionalities of MS Word, but copying of the underlying code would be unlawful. (Don’t take this too literally, however, because the issue of software patents, including those granted to Microsoft — one of present controversy in the US — could prevent another coder from achieving the same functionality under the patent law doctrine of “equivalents,” whether or not code was actually purloined.)

Unless, that is, the copying were protected by the so-called fair use doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107.  This exception allows use of some, but not all, of an original work by another (with or without attribution), and is the basic reason why bloggers who quote portions of other posts are acting lawfully.  On the other hand, lifting the entire portion of any article, whether blogged or on a traditional media site, is typically illegal without the consent (i.e., license) of the copyright holder. Yet again, if the expression itself is already in the public domain, then courts will not uphold a copyright claim, concluding either that the author “impliedly” licensed the content, abandoned any copyright in the expression, or that the material is not copyrightable in the first instance because not original.

Putting all these basic principles together yields precisely the answer posed for social media legal questions generally in Part I of this series — “it depends.”  If a blogger structures his site with a full Creative Commons license, then nothing posted is subject to copyright because he has abandoned such a claim.  If a Facebook user posts photographs to his or her Facebook page, and makes them available to friends, a copyright claim likely would not lie against those friends if they used the photos without permission.  But, as we shall see below, these are the easy situations in which application of IP principles is (relatively) clear.

(b) Are Tweets Copyrighted? This was the question, first posed in the blogosphere by Mark Cuban in May 2009 (“Are Tweets Copyrighted?“), addressed in part in an earlier post.  To summarize, a Tweet, like any other expression, can be copyrighted if original, not public domain and not impliedly licensed.  But neither Mark nor anyone else (as far as this author knows) has addressed whether a Tweet, at 140 characters, is inherently too short, i.e., too superficial, to be deemed an original expression for purposes of copyright.  Compare, for instance, Pat Riley’s famous trademark in the early 1990s on “three-peat” while with the L.A. Lakers.  Whether the same phrase could be copyrighted is doubtful.

The point here is that social media sites cannot create rights that otherwise do not exist in the law, but can narrow or waive rights otherwise held by users with their ToS agreements.  The conclusion that because Twitter has disclaimed ownership of Tweets the tweeting user must necessarily own them is a false syllogism.  In other words, the language in the Twitter ToS to the effect that “what’s yours is yours” and that ”[the Twitter account owner] profile and materials remain yours‚” is merely prcatory, as lawyers say.  It doesn’t bind anyone and certainly cannot govern if the copyright claim is disputed in court.

Copyrightable contents must be original, an expression (not a fact or opinion) and not merely an idea. If the material you post through Twitter isn’t copyrightable to begin with, it will not mystically transform into protectable content merely by being Tweeted, and decidedly not because, as between Twitter and its users, Twitter has technically disclaimed ownership. Hence, as one writer cogently observed:

The long and short of it is this: if 90% of all Tweets are nothing more than recitation of facts. That means that about 90% of Tweets are not protectable. For the other 10%, we’re not done with you yet. It’s all in how those facts are stated.

Twitterlogical—The Misunderstanding of Ownership. [Note to author Brock Shinen: this is most decidedly fair use!!]  Also useful in this regard is an interesting blog post by PR specialist Evan Hanlon on the conflict between social media and copyright law as applied to digital music sharing.

Well, it’s not really “how the facts are stated” so much as whether the expression is original and not somehow “donated” to the public domain by posting on Twitter.  A serious argument can be made, with which I tend to agree, that Tweets inherently cannot be copyrighted, even IF original, because the very act of posting them on Twitter means the entire world can see them, without the author’s permission. So unlike other social media sites, where access to UGC can be controlled, at first blush it seems that unless one has a “private” Twitter feed, one cannot claim copyright in Tweets because the very nature of tweeting is that the tweeter intends that anyone in the world can view, link to and use his or her Twitter UGC.

(c) Tweets and Fair Use. Indeed, the underlying rationale for according Tweets copyright protection breaks down entirely when one examines fair use.  First, if copyright applies to public Tweets, then traditional media’s use of them to date — including reading or displaying in full on television — cannot be fair use because it copies the entire “expression.”  Second, the accepted practice of “retweeting” (RT) contradicts the basic principles of copyright law. Because users can (and do) retweet without limitation, it is a fair conclusion that posting a Tweet is an implied  copyright license, at least for duplication by others on the same site.  As Mashable’s Pete Cashmore noted, taking another user’s Tweets is not “copying,” but “retweeting. And I love it..”  That comes at the question from the perspective of third-parties, rather than the putative content owner, but cogently expresses the idea that application of copyright to Tweets is problematic, at best.

Now it remains true that general legal rights and obligations can be varied by agreement.  And to date, courts have largely accepted the de facto use of checkboxes to indicate a user’s “acceptance” of ToS contracts, drafted entirely by Web site owners, to which they have had no input or ability to negotiate. (California recently signaled a possible change to this assumption with a controversial decision as to software “shrink wrap” agreements, however.)  So, assume we are now dealing with photos instead of 140-character messages.  No one would argue that photos cannot be (or generally are not) copyrightable original expressions. So then — unless the act of posting itself is abandonment of a claim of copyright — ownership of rights on photos will be determined by the ToS of the social media Web site owner.

(d) Style or Substance? Here we have an interesting contrast. Facebook, as noted, has advocated a rather different view of copyright, insisting on a royalty free, perpetual license to UGC as a condition of posting — indeed, a license that survives death or withdrawal.  Absent some independent constraint, like unconscionability, those ToS licenses are valid, regardless of a user’s rights under the Copyright Act. And Facebook has a point, because once “shared” with friends on the site, photos are (or at least can be) copied to some or all friends’ pages.  Twitter, in contrast, says that UGC is always the user’s property. (As careful lawyers, however, Twitter’s counsel also include an express ToS license, even though retaining the “what’s yours is yours” language.)

This license is you authorizing us to make your Tweets available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. But what’s yours is yours — you own your content.

Yet the inherently public nature of Tweets, which are “shared” with others by posting but not (except by retweeting) cross-posted as on Facebook, means that Twitter really does not need a license to the content of Tweets, since it does nothing with them other than what the user specifically intended, namely posting them on a Web page.

In the final analysis, this difference is probably more cosmetic than substantive, more about optics than legal rights.  Twitter has designs to become the real-time Web’s “utility” infrastructure, so its business model does not require, indeed conflicts with, the company’s ownership or licensing of UGC.  Facebook, in contrast, is a walled community, constantly devising ways for user to spend more time (whether or not productive or addictive) on the site.  So for Facebook, and especially because any element of a Facebook profile can be made private, including to all other Facebook members, its buisness needs licensing for the model to work.  They are different business models, driving different views of IP law.  Just like beauty, in other words, the answer is in the eyes of those with the content itself!

And, BTW, if you think the above is thorny or complex, just ponder for a moment the even more opaque question of who owns UGC after the user dies. We’ve needed living wills and medical powers of attorney for more than a decade to exert personal control critical health care decisions. Will we also need Web-proxies authorizing our medical decision-makers and heirs to access and control UGC? Yup, you know the answer — “it depends.”  A week or so after I first posted this essay, in fact, Facebook announced that it will “memorialize” profiles of deceased members if their friends or family request it.  Facebook Keeps Profiles of the Dead [AP].  That may not be the law, as of now, but it does suggest that social networks will increasingly be required as a practical matter to develop their own policies, based on the interests and needs of their users, on how to address death in cyberspace.

In Part III of this series, we explore trademarks, genericide & “Twittersquatting.”

 

An Update on the DMCA

Last May I posted — in an article titled “Challenging DMCA Conventional Wisdom” — about a creative, but seemingly futile, effort by RealNetworks to plead its way around the Digital Millennium Copyright Act for yet another variant of DVD-ripping software. Well I missed the conclusion. In mid-August a federal court in San Jose (the Northern District of California) sided with the movie studios against Real, issuing a permanent injunction, and holding in a well-reasoned opinion in RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Association, that Real had violated the DMCA.

So this is effectively the end of RealDVD. Calling the DMCA a series of “epochal amendments” to US copyright law, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel concluded that CSS technology “effectively controls access” despite having been hacked, finding that the statute is directed at preventing circumvention by the “average consumer,” and that Real’s CSS license was no protection because it had exceeded the scope of the license.

While it is true that no case has ever held that a licensee of the DVD [Copy Control Association] can be held liable for circumventing that same technology under the DMCA, that is simply because no court has ever adjudicated the issue. And, it may be that no licensee has been so bold as Real.

Perhaps the only amusing part of this rather sad escapade is the court’s observation that the RealDVD product was known internally as “Vegas,” because of the well-known marketing phrase “what happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas.” Secrets don’t hold up that well in Hollywood, on the other hand.

Remastered Masters

I am waiting, ostensibly patiently, for arrival of the complete collection of The Beatles music on newly remastered digital CDs. It is a little odd, though, since the group pioneered so many innovative recoding techniques in the analog realm. This performance of Revolution from U.S. television will have to do for now.

Posted via email from glenn’s posterous

France is Different, Really

This post illustrates that even countries with legal traditions very different from that of the United States can teach Americans something about values. In France, criminal investigations follow the “j’accuse” model, under the Code pénal, where a single judge — known as the Juge d’Instruction — controls investigation and charging of suspects, and under which a defendant’s silence can be held against him and the burden of proof is far less than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required here. France has also taken a rather different approach to civil law on the Internet, for instance holding Yahoo! liable for anti-semitic postings by users.

But these differences also go in another direction. Several weeks ago the French Assembly passed a measure, known as the “three strikes” law, that required ISPs to terminate Internet access for users found to have downloaded copyrighted materials at least three times. That law has now been set aside as unconstitutional (yes, France actually has a constitution!) by the French courts.

The French Constitutional Council ruled Wednesday that the law’s reliance on the government committee to make decisions on when to cut off people’s Internet access made it incompatible with the French Constitution. Since the “Internet is an element of freedom of speech and the right to consume,” only a judge has the power to deprive someone of it, according to the decision.

As a result, the law will be enacted without the “third-strike” of cutting off Internet access. Instead the government agency only will be permitted to send out mail and email warnings to suspected pirates. If it wants to further sanction an alleged illegal downloader, it will have to go to court.

Sarkozy’s Web-Piracy Fight Dealt Blow [WSJ.com].

While the decision rests ultimately on what we in the U.S. would term separation-of-powers, namely the relationship among different branches of government, it also introduces a concept completely alien to the American legal system. Although the Declaration of Independence starts with several self-evident truths, “liberty” and the First Amendment have never been interpreted to protect a “fundamental right” to communicate via the Internet, let alone break copyright laws. So in the U.S., a government agency can access one’s Internet usage from an ISP without a warrant (and sometimes without a subpoena) and a subscriber’s relationship with his or her ISP is a creature of private contract, not statutory, let alone constitutional, protection.

I am not suggesting that America adopt any or all of the French code-based legal system. What I believe this shows, however, is that even cultures which most Americans would regard as less concerned with the basic freedoms of its citizens — Americans would never stand for a system under which prosecutor and judge were combined in a single agency, judge or other government official — can teach us something about the values underlying the legal relationship of people to their government. Here in America we are blessed with constitutional rights. But basic human needs, like housing, jobs and medical care, are not a legal right. Internet access is very important to success in today’s economy, and I for one suggest that perhaps a debate on whether relegating that issue to the private, unilateral terms of service (ToS) of ISPs and Web site operators is a paradigm that is unlikely to be successful in the long term.

Goodbye “freedom fries.” You Frenchies aren’t so bad after all.

Challenging DMCA Conventional Wisdom

Most observers believe that, right or wrong, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) prohibits copying of DVDs, even for backup purposes, because of its Content Scrambling System (CSS) encryption technology. Now Real Networks is challenging that conventional wisdom in California, where its RealDVD product is under attack. But the litigation developments actually suggest that Real is taking a different direction. According to CNet News, a “surprise” expert witness for Real:

disputes Hollywood’s claims that the industry included in a license for its DVD-encryption technology a ban on copying DVDs while in a computer hard drive. Real argues that because it possesses a license to use CSS and because the license doesn’t prohibit the copying of DVDs in all cases, Real isn’t guilty of breaching its contract.

How Real squares its contract argument with the DMCA claims against it by the movie studios is convoluted. Without getting into a lot of detail, the gist of the DMCA prohibition on reverse-engineering is that no one is permitted to “circumvent” technological means applied to protect digital content (i.e., DRM or content protection). The anti-circumvention provisions “put the force of law behind any technological systems used by copyright owners to control access to and copying of their digital works.” That’s exactly what CSS does, as I understand the technology. The fact that a CSS license may not prohibit copying is not the same as whether it is permitted under DMCA. So this approach is a good one for Real, but almost surely will be less than acceptable to the “open commons” crowd, which has detested the DMCA standard for a long time.

If you are interested, and especially if you disagree, please tell the U.S. Copyright Office, which is handling another periodic rulemaking to define what is and is not prohibited under the statute.

Who Owns Social Media UGC?

Two weeks ago there was a major outcry within the Facebook community over revised Terms of Service (ToS) for the hugely popular social networking site. The gist of the protest was an implication in the new ToS that Facebook claimed “ownership” of user-generated content (UGC) and reserved the right to market it for for commercial purposes.

Facebook ToS

Facebook ToS

That conclusion would be rather stupid from a business perspective and was quickly disowned by Facebook management. Facebook CEO Zuckerberg: “We Do Not Own User Data” [Mashable]. But because this was a Website policy, changeable unilaterally without user consent, it leaves unanswered the larger question of whether UGC is owned by the person posting the content, the person on who’s page/site the content appears or the owner of the service/server. The issue is WAY broader than Facebook. It applies, for instance, to comments posted on newspaper sites, blogs, photos shared on Flickr and the like, and many more applications.

Today I am not trying to answer the question, rather raising some. In the law of traditional commercial relationships — say banking or telephony — the “content” one shares with a company is owned by the corporation. Your banking records can be obtained by the government without your consent because they are “owned” by the bank. Only sector-specific privacy laws like Gramm-Leach-Bliley, which are altogether too rare in the United States, limit what the company can go with data arising from its relationship with customers. Hence, Facebook was possibly wrong (although correct from a customer relationship standpoint) to argue that it needed a license from one user to display his/her content on the “Wall” of another user, even when the first person had affirmatively decided to share that UGC by posting it within Facebook.

But what of corporations as employers? Since the law is settled, right or wrong, that a company owns emails generated on its systems, regardless of whether work-related, will that same conclusion hold for social communications sent and received via an enterprise Internet connection? And what of copyright; if a user posts photos to a sharing site, does that act imply either abandonment of their ownership interest or the grant of a “fair use” right to republication in full to the world?

These are interesting, and perhaps important, questions in the developing law of social media. Stay tuned here for more analysis and discussion as we make some tentative predictions of how the law will evolve and whether, in the ultimate analysis, it matters.

Reality for Real

Wow, I’ve blogged in the past about how Real Networks’ devotion to subscription music distribution was an archaic business model. Now, Rob Glaser and company are about to launch a new software product that, if ruled lawful under the DMCA, may revolutionize movie distribution. Real Networks Throws Down the DVD Copy Gauntlet [FT.com]. In a post-Napster legal environment, however, it is fair to say that no one can predict with certainty how these sorts of issues will play out. But if Cablevision can offer a remote-storage DVR on the theory that users are copying, not the device’s software, there is a good chance Real is right. Good luck and Apple TV watch out now!

A Bureaucratic Farce

That’s what Andrew Orlowski of the UK’s The Register calls Friday’s decision by the Federal Communications Commission to cite Comcast for unlawful violation of "network neutrality" principles. One can agree or disagree with the proposition, endorsed by FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, that Internet users should be free to reach any site without interference by their ISPs.

“We are preserving the open character of the Internet,” Martin said in an interview after the 3-to-2 vote. “We are saying that network operators can’t block people from getting access to any content and any applications.”

But it is just absurd to conclude that any federal government agency should be allowed to issue what it expressly terms a set of non-binding "principles" and then make an official finding of illegality when a company fails to follow those principles. Confusing is an understatement here.  Dissenting Commissioner Rob McDowell’s complaint that the FCC here is actively regulating the Internet — or at least historically unregulated "enhanced services" offered by ISPs, unlike common carrier telecommunications services — is spot on.