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Rockstar’s Patent Trolling Conspiracy

The strangely named Rockstar Consortium has been in the news again, in part because some of its members just formed a new lobbying group, the Partnership for American Innovation, aimed at preventing the current political furor over patent trolls from bleeding into a general overhaul of the U.S. patent system. Yet Rockstar is perhaps the most aggressive patent troll out there today. Hence the mounting pressure in Washington, DC for the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division — which signed off on the initial formation of Rockstar two years ago — to open up a formal probe into the consortium’s patent assertion activities directed against rival tech firms, principally Google, Samsung and other Android device manufacturers.

Usually the fatal defect in antitrust claims of horizontal collusion is proving that competing firms acted in parallel fashion from mutual agreement rather than independent business judgment. In the case of Rockstar — a joint venture among nearly all smartphone platform providers except Google — that problem is not present because the entity itself exists only by agreement among its owner firms. The question for U.S. antitrust enforcers is thus the traditional substantive inquiry, under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, whether Rockstar’s conduct is unreasonably restrictive of competition.

Rockstar Consortium logo

Despite its cocky moniker, Rockstar is simply a corporate patent troll hatched by Google’s rivals, who collectively spent $4.5 billion ($2.5 billion from Apple alone) in 2012 to buy a trove of wireless-related patents out of bankruptcy from Nortel, the long-defunct Canadian telecom company. It is engaged in a zero-sum game of gotcha against the Android ecosystem. As Brian Kahin explained presciently on DisCo then, Rockstar is not about making money, it’s about raising costs for rivals — making strategic use of the patent system’s problems for competitive advantage. Creating or collaborating with trolls is a new game known as privateering, which allows big producing companies to do indirectly what they cannot do directly for fear of exposure to expensive counterclaims. Essentially, it’s patent trolling gone corporate. As another pro-patent lobbying group said at the time, Rockstar represents “a perfect example of a ‘patent troll’ — they bought the patents they did not invent and do not practice; and they bought it for litigation.” Predictiv’s Jonathan Low put it quite well in his The Lowdown blog:

The Rockstar consortium, perhaps more appropriately titled “crawled out from under a rock,” is using classic patent troll tactics since their own technologies and marketing strategies have fallen short in the face of the Android emergence as a global power. Those tactics are to buy patents in hopes of finding cause, however flimsy, to charge others for alleged violations of patents bought for this purpose. Rockstar calls this “privateering” in order to distance itself from the stench of patent trolling, but there are no discernible differences.

Continue reading Rockstar’s Patent Trolling Conspiracy

Four Reasons Fairsearch Is Wrong

Google’s competitors “are locked in hand-to-hand combat with Google around the world and have the mistaken belief that criticizing us will influence the outcome in other jurisdictions.”
— (Former) FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz, Jan. 2013

The coalition of companies that for years has unsuccessfully been pressing antitrust complaints against Google for search “abuse” — FairSearch.org — insists Google must be restrained for fear the Mountain View company will steer search users to its commercial products, like flight bookings. The group’s most recent publicity event, held at the ABA’s Antitrust Section annual spring meeting last week, repeated those same claims. FairSearch ventured as well into new ground, attacking what it terms Google’s unreasonably restrictive Android licensing practices.

There are four straightforward reasons FairSearch is wrong.

1.  Predictions of Foreclosure Have Proven Totally Baseless.

When Google purchased travel software maker ITA in 2011, FairSearch maintained that Google would exploit its control over the ITA tools that power other online travel agencies, along with many of the airlines’ own sites, to usher competing search services off the stage, then jack up ad rates for travel queries and favor flights from particular airlines. google-eu-antitrust Three years later, nothing like that has happened. In fact, Google Flight Search is not among the top 100 or even the top 200 travel listing sites. Rather, it’s in 244th place, behind Hipmunk, with just .04% of travel queries. Real-world experience, in other words, reveals that the predicted competitive risks on which FairSearch bases its advocacy are both hypothetical and fanciful. Continue reading Four Reasons Fairsearch Is Wrong

War of the Worlds: The Google Settlements in America and the EU

Thirteen months after the U.S. Federal Trade Commission settled its antitrust investigation of Google Inc. by flatly declining to regulate the company’s search practices, the European Union is poised to do just that. This development highlights a serious rift between the two most influential competition authorities worldwide — and their very different value systems.

FTC

It has been true for years that on important Internet policy issues such as privacy, defamation, censorship and government surveillance, the 30-member EU has adopted principles far more intrusive for businesses, and likewise more protective of consumers, than in the U.S. Similarly, ever since a proposed General Electric-Honeywell merger was scuttled by the European Commission’s competition directorate in 2000, there have been a few highly visible cases in which the EU’s view of antitrust as a basis for protection of smaller entities in the marketplace has produced sharply different results.

So it is hardly surprising that EU Competition Commissioner Joaquin Almunia announced recently that several expanded concessions offered by Google to resolve his concerns about the fairness of the company’s search practices — which would fundamentally alter search by requiring Google to display links to rival search competitors on results pages served to its own search users  — had finally borne fruit. The most basic competition issue asserted by the European authorities was that Google gives preference to its own services, like travel search, by placing those “specialised” (in European spelling) results above “organic” or natural search results. Google proposes to label these specialized results as paid placements and to add prominent links to rivals alongside. Despite vocal complaints by Google’s so-called vertical competitors that these substantial changes in search display — putting Expedia travel link results, for instance, on the same level of visibility as Google’s own sponsored links — still do not meet their needs, the fact that the EU is using its power to force serious search engine revisions on Google represents a watershed moment illustrating how far apart the two systems were and can still be at times.

European Commission

There are three principal ways in which the inconsistent U.S. and EU Google settlements epitomize this continuing war of the worlds over antitrust enforcement:

  1. Is Google a Bottleneck “Gateway”? Almunia’s investigation was overtly premised on the concept that Google’s 90 percent share of Web searches in Europe (compared to some 70 percent in the U.S.), equals monopoly power as a gateway essential to success for Internet businesses. American jurisprudence, in contrast, has largely abandoned the bottleneck classification and its corollary, the “essential facilities” doctrine. Moreover, U.S. competition enforcers and courts distinguish between consumer preferences (which are changeable) and a dominant’s firm’s economic power (which can persist for long only when sheltered by entry barriers) in a way that contradicts the EU premise. As one federal court explained in January, the “ability to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ distinguishes broadband providers from other participants in the Internet market­place — including prominent and potentially powerful edge providers such as Google and Apple — who have no similar control over access to the Internet for their subscribers and for anyone wishing to reach those subscribers.”
  2.  Is Consumer Deception an Antitrust Issue? The EU has been focused, in large part, on the fact that when redesigning its search result displays, Google may have confused Internet users by not specifically indicating that some results are now based not on generic search algorithms, but instead a decision to integrate links to Google’s own services on results pages. Almunia believes that the potential for misleading consumers justifies a competition remedy, saying that Google must “signal what are the relevant options, alternative options, in the way they present the results.” In contrast, American antitrust law is clear that fraud, deceptive advertising and other commercial bad acts alone are not of competitive concern. Consumer protection remains important in the U.S., but our legal principles separate regulation of consumer issues from the competition-preservation function of antitrust policy.
  3.  Should Antitrust Protect Traffic to Google’s Competitors? By far the biggest difference in the EU approach to competition enforcement is the historical European preference for domestic firms in established industries. In France, for instance, Internet publishers pay a tax that subsidizes newspapers and printed mapmakers, something anathema to the American idea of a free market. Where Google is concerned, the question becomes whether, as an important source of Web traffic for competing specialized search services, its practices should be regulated in order to guarantee hits to rival sites. The EU has been somewhat schizophrenic, at first condemning what it termed “diversion of traffic” to Google itself and characterizing its mission as to “guarantee that search results have the highest possible quality,” then later stressing that its “aim is not to artificially send traffic to sites that compete with Google.” The bottom line, however, is that by seeking to stop Google from “diverting” Internet search users from the complaining sites, the EU is in part attempting to dictate the results of competition, something American antitrust leaves to the marketplace.

Yes, these differences can sometimes be overstated. Both the EU and American antitrust agencies mutually believe that competitive markets produce the best outcomes and that, absent abuse by firms with monopoly power, the government should not try to pick winners and losers. The contrasting values typically appear only in hard cases, where the facts are ambiguous or the competitive consequences difficult to predict. Different enforcement decisions in Europe and the U.S. are uncommon, but when they do occur, are important as more than isolated instances.

There is a ray of light in all of this, one conclusion on which both Almunia and Jon Leibowitz, the former FTC Chairman who closed the U.S. government’s investigation of Google last year, agree wholeheartedly. Neither the EU nor the FTC accepts the premise of complaining search competitors that antitrust law embraces a concept they term “search neutrality,” namely that search providers must treat all queries and results under the same objective standard. The FTC said it had neither the desire nor institutional expertise to “regulate the intricacies of Google’s search engine algorithm.” The EU likewise concluded that its Google remedies should address “the way they present their own services” rather than “discussing the algorithm” used for Internet search.

This is one way, unlike the Martian invaders in the H.G. Wells novel, that the shared histories of America and Europe give the developed world a sustainable advantage in economic performance. On both the continent and in the New World, new business ideas succeed if they are better designed to meet the needs of consumers. With rare exceptions, we do not intervene in the marketplace to achieve government-desired competition results or to exclude some firms for political or social reasons. That is particularly key to the different Google search remedy approaches. Since everyone admits Google got to its present position by building a better search engine, the consequences of allowing competition policy to morph into an artificial tool of technology regulation by way of search neutrality are enforcement quicksand for the govern­ment, regardless of which “side of the pond” it sits.

 

Foundem Has Lost It

In the ongoing saga of governmental antitrust investigations of Google, recent weeks have witnessed a new level of rhetoric and disingenuous use of the regulatory process to handicap, rather than promote, competition and innovation. The current case in point relates once again to search neutrality, but this time complaining rivals remarkably object to getting exactly what they’ve asked for over many years.

Just a little less than four months after the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) closed its monopolization investigation into alleged “search bias” by Google, the European Commission (EC) — the pan-European competition authority for the 30-nation European Economic Area (EEA) — released a set of proposed commitments by Google designed to resolve the competition “concerns” preliminarily outlined by EC competition chief Joaquin Almunia. That set off a firestorm of criticism from so-called “vertical” competitors (e.g., travel booking or consumer shopping sites), led by UK firm Foundem, a plaintiff against Google in its own antitrust lawsuit in England.

FoundemThe first and most basic competition concern asserted by the EC was that Google gives preference to its own services, like travel search, by placing those “specialised” (in European spelling) search results above “organic” or “natural” search results. Google proposes to label these specialized results as paid placements and to add equally prominent links to vertical rivals alongside. Under the commitments Google would auction links for commercial services to qualifying rivals using a lengthy set of rules for transparent and equal treatment. It is precisely the paid link insertion remedy that Google critic and long-time legal adversary Gary Reback called for at an April 2013 FairSearch.org event in Washington, DC.

Foundem opposes that solution. But making heads or tails of Foundem’s rather incoherent response to Google’s EC settlement proposal is difficult. In part that’s because the response is a hodge-podge of discredited claims, incorrect assumptions and fuzzy reasoning. In part it’s because Foundem’s use of over-the-top language and Chicken Little predictions makes it impossible to decipher facts and reality from mere opinions and sour grapes. For instance:

If the Commission were to adopt Google’s proposals in anything like their present form, it would be unwittingly playing into Google’s hands — aiding and abetting Google in its long running strategy to transition commercial searches away from its natural search results and into its paid advertisements. Under these proposals, Google would not only continue to profit from the traffic it hijacks from rivals, but it would now also profit from the traffic it sends to rivals…. Any vertical search companies that survive the transition to such a radically altered and unfavourable marketplace would be left eking out a living on the slimmest of margins from the scraps left over from the traffic, and now revenues, that Google would be diverting to its own services.

If one separates the adjectives from Foundem’s substantive criticisms, there are four principal contentions it makes.

1. “Universal Search” labeling does not fix organic search manipulation. Foundem says the EC proposal addresses only the “preference” of Google’s own links in a prominent area of its redesigned Universal Search results pages, not the use of search algorithms allegedly to demote links to vertical rivals. “Instead, with a flourish of misdirection, they focus exclusively on its [sic] Universal Search inserts.” Because the commitments “ignore Google’s natural search results, they are misdirected in their application and fall far short of their target.”

2. Paid Rival Links would benefit Google financially. Foundem complains that Google’s proposal to insert paid links to vertical rivals for commercial searches will allow it to “monetise” (again in European spelling) rivals’ Web traffic. The proposal, Foundem claims, would allow Google to become “the main beneficiary of its rivals’ vertical search services as well as its own,” which would “extend Google’s existing monopoly powers and could eventually leave it in sole possession of the efficient, low-overhead, business model that has characterised and fuelled the internet revolution.”

3. Google should be prohibited from applying site quality algorithms. Foundem asserts that the use of website quality metrics designed to weed out malware, spam and search-manipulated sites that lack content is inherently anticompetitive, but that Google’s corresponding commitment to include all vertical rivals absent “some clearly defined Harmful Practices (such as illegal content and consumer deception)” or with “prior individual approval from the [European] Commission” is inadequate.

4. The Google commitments do not extend to non-search services. Foundem complains that ”vertical search was simply the natural first target for Google. Google can (and will, if it isn’t stopped) extend the same abusive practices into other sectors, including e-commerce, auctions, and social networks.” It opposes the proposed commitments because they do not cover these other Internet-based services.

Each of these criticisms is misplaced, but none more so than the claim that the Google proposal should be rejected because it somehow misses the big problem in search. The EC’s principal competition concern was that Google gave undue preference to its own vertical services with the invention of Universal Search. Therefore, inserting links to rivals in that same “preferential,” prominently outlined space above organic search results provides obvious parity between Google’s shopping service, for instance, and Foundem’s consumer electronics listings. The second concern was that Universal Search deceives users into thinking results are something other than promotion of Google’s own commercial services because the lack of a clear distinction between a promoted link and normal search results “left some consumers less able to make an informed choice.” Hence, as I’ve addressed in detail before, a label remedy is precisely the right solution to what is, at heart, a contention of misleading trade practices.

The FTC notably concluded that Google’s switch to Universal Search was a bona fide search innovation that benefited consumers. Mr. Almunia has made essentially the same concession. To the extent Foundem believes the practice is inherently anticompetitive and should be banned, as it appears, its critique is inapposite to an evaluation of the effectiveness of Google’s proposed EC commitments. Even in Europe, competition authorities do not outlaw products developed by firms with market power, and EC competition law, like that in the US, is strongly disinclined to sanction an antitrust case based on allegations of “anticompetitive product design.”

The reason for this restraint is simple: competition officials and courts are not engineers or businessmen and thus have no objective basis on which to assess whether product designs are “good” or not. That is a decision left to the marketplace, with consumers literally voting with their clicks and wallets. Indeed, such reserve is essential in technology markets, where product innovation occurs at the speed of light in and in which user interface and consumer experience are so subtle and competitively important. It is the reason former FTC chairman Jon Leibowitz — on behalf of a unanimous, politically diverse five-commissioner agency — rejected calls that antitrust should be used to “regulate the intricacies of Google’s search algorithms.” Ditto Mr. Almunia, who likewise told the Financial Times back in January that his concern is “the way they present their own services” and that he was “not discussing the algorithm” used for Internet search.

Foundem’s other critiques are nonsensical. Including Paid Rival Links alongside Google’s own universal shopping and commercial links (themselves paid) requires someone to set a fair price. That is something bureaucrats and antitrust agencies again do not do well, if at all, but an auction does perfectly. There is plainly no room to include links for every commercial search site on every Google search results page, so an auction system allocates that scarce space to businesses based on their own financial calculus of the benefit of preferential placement. That’s not monetizing rivals’ traffic and does not require Foundem or any other Google competitor to participate. If these Paid Rival Links are as worthless as Foundem implies, then its prediction of Google using them as a way to usurp competitors’ revenues is especially silly, because the auction prices will be negligible. Indeed, to suggest that paid placement is for some reason invalid as a competitive search service represents the height of hubris for Foundem, whose business model is to sell all search results. If paid placement is OK for Foundem it is equally permissible for any other search firm, small or big or anywhere in between.

It’s hard to take seriously a company which contends that site quality algorithms are invalid, when we all know the entire SEO, pornography and content piracy industries try their damnedest to game search results and avoid content filters established by responsible search engines like Google. Foundem never explains why the objective criteria Google has committed to apply do not resolve its allegation that rival links were targeted for demotion unfairly. While I personally disagree with the need or justification for any such remedy, the fact is that Google’s proposed settlement directly addresses organic link results by precluding exactly the type of targeted “link demotion” that FairSearch.org, Mr. Reback and Foundem itself have long alleged Google engages in as a matter of ordinary course.

Lastly, consider for a brief moment Foundem’s odd criticism that Google has not offered proposals for “other sectors” like auctions and social networks. Foundem itself does not operate in those markets, which are obviously not Internet search. With the rather spectacular failure to date of Google+ to challenge Facebook and Twitter, or any Google service to take on eBay, no one has even claimed Google has any chance of monopolizing these very different markets. When and if there are problems of Google accumulating market power in new services against entrenched Web firms — an eventuality that is all but inconceivable today — antitrust authorities can intervene. To do so in a case about allegations of Web search dominance and abuse is unseemly by any standard, European or American.

Note:  Originally prepared for and reposted with permission of the Disruptive Competition Project.

Disco Project

 

Defamation, Autocomplete And Search Royalties: How Not To Govern the Internet

With the controversy surrounding the International Telecommunications Union (a UN treaty organization) just recently subsiding, it is time to take a look at Internet governance from a different perspective. We all know that laws and legal principles differ among countries. What many do not realize is that these laws — most completely non-tech oriented — are having a massive and negative impact on Internet innovation.

In America we proudly have the First Amendment, the fair use doctrine and the DMCA. The first limits the reach of liability for libel (defamation) at least to cases, for non-celebrities, where a publisher is at fault (i.e., negligent). Section 230 of the last allows ISPs, websites and Internet hosts a legal safe harbor from copyright and other legal offenses resulting from user-generated content or any other content that a customer, client or some third-party has published. These landmark legal regimes are hallowed in the U.S., for instance used to strike down overreaching Web censorship efforts by federal government. Fair use, in turn, permits non-commercial or transformative use of a portion of copyrighted content. Think Google image search thumbnails or blockquotes from a news source in someone’s blog or a movie clip in a televised review.

Things are very different elsewhere. Three cases in point.

  1. In Germany and perhaps soon other EU nations, search engines that display snippets of indexed Web pages in response to user queries are now by statute responsible for paying copyright royalties to the original publisher, regardless of whether the content owner charges for its stories with a paywall. 
  2. In France, Italy, Ireland,  Australia and now Japan, courts permit individuals to recover for libel based on autocomplete and search results that return incorrect or harmful personal information, but against the search provider, not the writer or content publisher.
  3. A Denmark court ruled deep linking illegal, as did Germany, leading some to believe that linking to a website other than the front page was illegal throughout Europe. While the German courts overturned that decision, it was Agence France Presse (AFP) which eventually sued Google News for brazenly daring to send search  traffic to the organization’s news articles.

AutomcompleteThese results are foreign, literally, to U.S. jurisprudence. But they also illustrate a vitally important point. Legal regimes that have nothing to do with the Web are being applied in ways which upset existing services users take for granted and that threaten to impede future innovation.  Linking is inherent in HTML and represents the essence of the Web. No one in America would argue seriously today that a hypertext URL link represents copyright violation. Search “autocomplete,” in turn, is not a creative activity, but a very useful technical advancement; it applies computer algorithms based on past searches to predict what the current user wants to see, speeding the retrieval of information from the Web.

Permitting autocomplete defamation suits against Google or Bing because other Web users have searched for information that damages an individual’s reputation is alien to our American way of thinking. It’s censoring completely accurate factual information about stuff on the Web, although that stuff may itself be factually wrong.  The augmentation of liability is also just plain silly, because both autocomplete queries and search results themselves merely return an indexed link to something someone else has posted on the Web.

Continue reading Defamation, Autocomplete And Search Royalties: How Not To Govern the Internet

Fair Is Fair In Search

Google-EU

Just a couple of weeks ago I put together a brief synopsis of the now-closed Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation of Google, Inc. for alleged monopolization, titled Deconstructing the FTC’s Google Investigation. To make the article fit within the space constraints of the American Bar Association’s Monopoly Matters newsletter, though, a few thoughts had to be edited out. One that is particularly appropriate now is the cogent observation by former FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz that rivals frequently operate under the “mistaken belief” that criticizing the agency “will influence the outcome in other jurisdictions.”

Last Wednesday’s PR event by the FairSearch.org coalition made that evident in spades. We’ve discussed before that use of competition law to handicap other firms, rather than removing barriers to market competition, is unabashed protectionism, which can (perhaps should) backfire. The FairSearch companies continue to insist, as the coalition’s U.S. lawyer summarized, that the FTC “did not take on the issue of search bias.” That’s hogwash. The Commission found no evidence of harm to competition and, more importantly, rejected the FairSearch call for “regulating the intricacies of Google’s search engine algorithm.” And yet like Chicken Little, these companies continue to claim the sky is falling.

Leave aside for a moment that the FairSearch media event featured four legal presenters, all of whom are supporters of its lobbying positions, instead of a “fair and balanced” debate. And forget for a moment that the European Union’s parallel investigation (wrapped in much of the secrecy typical of an EU approach to competition regulation) is some 42 months old, with a possible end just recently within sight. What is most remarkable about the denial exhibited at the FairSearch media event is its blatant internal inconsistency. Three examples of the group’s positions make this abundantly clear.

  1. “Deception” Warrants a Disclosure Remedy.  Former Assistant Attorney General Tom Barnett testified in 2011, for a founding FairSearch member, that Google acted anticompetitively because its “display of search results is deceptive to users.” FairSearch’s European counsel said the same thing recently, namely that Google “uses deceptive conduct to lockout competition in mobile.” But as I’ve noted previously, deception of this sort raises consumer protection issues, not legitimate antitrust concerns. Remarkably, Gary Reback scoffed at the reported suggestion by the EU’s Joaquin Almunia that a labeling remedy for Google’s revamped universal search results is appropriate, saying it’s “like telling McDonald’s customers they should eat healthy…it will not make a difference.” To the contrary, if deception is the problem then full disclosure has always been the answer. Where consumers are free to choose other search engines, and are told explicitly that some search results point to Google’s own “vertical” sites, whether they opt not to act is something about which competition authorities should be indifferent. Antitrust, at least in the United States, is not a Mayor Bloomberg-type vehicle for social engineering. 
  2. Price Regulation Is Not the Job of Competition Enforcers.  Ironically, the newest FairSearch approach raises the even more subtle antitrust issue of whether Google can be required to sell sponsored link ads to vertical rivals like Kayak and Yelp. FairSearch.org panelKnown in competition parlance as a “unilateral refusal to deal,” the idea is that the remedy for Google’s preferential placement of its own services in organic search results should be a mandatory sale of ad space to purportedly “demoted” competitors. That’s hard to swallow under American antitrust doctrine, which makes unilateral refusal cases very difficult to win, described by the Supreme Court as the “outer limits” of the Sherman Act. More importantly, as Reback put it, the obligation would be to sell ad space on “reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms,” which in turn means that an enforcement agency or court would have to decide whether the ad rates charged by Google were “reasonable.” So while disclaiming an intention to create a federal search regulatory commission, the FairSearch companies are in fact doing just that. Even in price fixing cases, antitrust agencies and courts do not decide what a fair or reasonable price is, because they lack the ability to do so and because, after all, that’s the function of competition.

  3. Mobile Really Is Different.  The FairSearch event also included a competition lawyer for Nokia (Ms. Jenni Lukander), who contended that Google acted irrationally by giving away its Android mobile operating system, claiming the OS is merely a “Trojan Horse to monetize mobile markets.” So what? Providing free or open source software while profiting from ancillary products or services is a valid business strategy, pioneered by Netscape nearly 20 years ago and exemplified by Java, MySQL and numerous “freemium” sites such as Dropbox, Evernote, etc., available today. (This complaint is even stranger given that Nokia open-sourced its own mobile operating system in 2010, presumably for rational business reasons.) The FairSearch panelists argue that mobile is different because Google is supposedly “dominant” in mobile search, citing a market share of some 97%. That is both factually wrong and immaterial. Mobile is indeed different because Web search is rapidly being replaced by voice-search and app-based queries, which make any Google advantage in desktop search engines irrelevant. When Yelp gets nearby 50% of its traffic from its own smartphone app, it is impossible to seriously maintain that Google’s search engine is “diverting traffic” in the mobile space from rivals. Moreover, what the newest FairSearch complaint in Europe contends is that Google’s control over the Android OS limits OEM freedom by requiring some Google app icons (like the Google Play app store) to be displayed. As Dan Rowinski observed in readwrite mobile, that’s incorrect — “all kinds of stupid,” in his words. See Amazon’s locked-down Kindle, which runs Android without a single Google icon or app, as just one example. Most significantly, none of these vertical restrictions, even if they have the effect Nokia suggests, has any impact at all on search or search advertising in the mobile market. It is a fair conclusion that by venturing into the mobile OS arena, FairSearch is not looking for search fairness as much as to handicap and distract a rival with the threat of government regulation.

Here is how the New York Times summarized the new Android complaint by FairSearch.

The complaint was filed by Fairsearch Europe, a group of Google’s competitors, including the mobile phone maker Nokia and the software titan Microsoft, and by other companies, like Oracle. It accuses Google of using the Android software “as a deceptive way to build advantages for key Google apps in 70 percent of the smartphones shipped today,” said Thomas Vinje, the lead lawyer for Fairsearch Europe, referring to Android’s share of the smartphone market.

Any believer in the merits of competitive market economies must object to such misuse of competition laws. They should also, I suggest, react the same way to the most recent indication from Mr. Almunia that the EU’s purpose in investigating Google is to “guarantee that search results have the highest possible quality.” Nothing distills the difference between the European and American approaches to competition law as much as that revealing admission. Product quality is a function of the marketplace, not the government. And if regulation of search quality is deemed a subject warranting governmental regulation (which this author hopes never occurs), the one principle on which every objective observer would agree is that a regulatory scheme should apply uniformly to all firms in the market. That is plainly not what FairSearch strives to achieve, and thus why its proposals should be rejected by enforcement authorities worldwide.

Note:  Originally prepared for and reposted with permission of the Disruptive Competition Project.

Disco Project

 

Deconstructing The FTC’s Google Investigation

This article was published by the ABA Antitrust Section’s Unilateral Conduct Committee in its Monopoly Matters journal for Spring 2013. (Reprinted with permission.)

ABA Antitrust Section @ Twitter

The recently closed Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) investigation of Google, Inc. for alleged monopolization[1] illustrates a truism of antitrust practice. The flexibility of antitrust law in adapting to new industries and modes of anticompetitive conduct is also a source of frustration, because the ex ante application of the domain’s broad principles to particular business practices is tricky to forecast without highly intensive, fact-specific analysis.

While a lot of ink was spilled following now-former Chairman Jon Leibowitz’s January 3, 2013 press conference, not much has attempted an analytical review of the merits. With the caveat that no outsider knows precisely what evidence the agency collected, this article tries to do just that. The lessons drawn are surprisingly unremarkable. Even in “new economy” industries, the tried-and-true elements of a monopolization claim remain crucial. Where unilateral conduct exhibits plausible efficiencies without serious evidence of competitive harm in a relevant market, it is impossible to make a viable case of monopoly maintenance under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (“Section 2”).

A.        Market Definition

As every antitrust practitioner can recite, being a monopoly is not itself illegal, rather it is unlawful to obtain or maintain monopoly power by exclusionary or anticompetitive means in a relevant antitrust market. The existence of a putative “Internet search” market is thus a core proposition in any attack on Google for unlawful monopolization; the necessary premise is that Google’s high share — estimated to be anywhere between 65 to 80% — for Web searches is the foundation of an alleged monopoly.

Here the legal analysis begins to break down. Internet search is a free product for which consumers (Internet users) are charged nothing, with the service supported by advertising revenues. Since monopoly power is the power to control price or exclude competition, Google’s high “market share” may not in fact reflect any actual market power. More importantly, search users are like television viewers; they are an input into a different product, search advertising, in which consumers are effectively sold by virtue of advertising rates based largely on impressions and click-throughs. Just as NBC and ABC compete for television viewers in order to sell more advertising, so too do search engines monetize the service by selling Internet eyeballs to advertisers.[2]

Relevant market analysis must therefore focus on the area where Google in fact competes with other search engines, namely the sale of search advertising. There are two significant problems with a “search advertising” market. First, this market definition does nothing to advance the cause of complainants such as Yelp, Kayak and other so-called “vertical” competitors of Google’s non-search products, because they do not compete for search advertisers. Second, the relevant market cannot be so limited:

  • Web search ads are good substitutes for display (e.g., banner) ads. Because advertisers pay for users who click through to their sites, both represent alternative ways to reach consumers. If Google raised prices for search ads,custo­mers would switch more of their advertising dollars to display ads. And the Internet display ad segment is something in which Google has lagged well ll behind the leader, Facebook.
  • Both search and display ads increasingly compete against mobile search ads. This rapidly growing segment is radically different, with searches designed to retrieve more targeted results and in which a near-majority of searches are performed within smartphone and tablet apps like OpenTable, FourSquare and others, bypassing traditional search engines.
  • Advertising-supported Internet services increasingly compete with traditional media for revenues. Newspapers have lost huge swaths of advertising revenues — especially, though hardly just, classified ads to Craigslist, etc. — but are making money in digital advertising. Nearly 1/3 of the New York Times’ total revenue came from online ads as far back as 2010.[3]

Neither the Chairman’s press conference nor the FTC’s parallel opinion on standard-essential-patents reveal whether the Commission agreed search advertising is a relevant market. One point seems clear: whatever the FTC concluded in its 2007 Google-DoubleClick merger review,[4] there are precious little indicia today supporting either Internet search or search advertising as stand-alone product markets for Section 2 purposes. See, e.g., Peterson v. Google, Inc., 2007 U.S. DIST LEXIS 47920 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (no basis to distinguish search advertising from other Internet advertising in market definition). As the Commission cautioned in 2007, “accounting for the dynamic nature” of “the online advertising space … requires solid grounding in facts and the careful application of tested antitrust analysis.”[5]

B.        Monopoly Power

This author has written elsewhere about The Fantasy Google Monopoly,[6] in which I observed that “the reality is that Google neither acts like nor is sheltered from competition like the monopolists of the past, something the company’s critics never claim because they just can’t.” The facts suggest that regardless of Google’s share in a properly defined market, Google does not enjoy market power.

No Bottleneck or “Gateway” Control. Ten years ago, when the FTC believed America Online had market power, the conclusion rested on the fact that a vertically integrated AOL controlled access to competing Internet content.[7] Much like the pre-divestiture Bell System, the concern was that AOL held a “bottleneck” through which consumers had to pass to reach rivals. Yet Google does not control the Internet’s physical network and is thus not a bottleneck. “Google, or any search engine, cannot be a gateway to the Internet.”[8]

No Power Over Price. Whether search ad rates are the price of search or alternatively the relevant antitrust market itself, they fail on the central criterion of control over price.  Google’s search ads are priced via an auction system — the highest bidder for an advertising keyword buys at its winning bid price. Certainly, there are ways to game an auction to favor some bidders and exert indirect influence on price. But such a novel theory of auction pricing power was apparently not asserted in the FTC’s investigation of Google.

No Network Effects. Nothing symbolizes modern antitrust so much as an emphasis on “network effects.”[9] Network effects exist when the value of a product increases in proportion to the number of other users of the product, hence a name which originated in telephone antitrust cases. There is little to suggest there are significant network effects in search or search advertising. That Sears may buy some search ad keywords, for example, makes it only slightly more likely (and a consequence of retail competition, not Google) that Macy’s will purchase search ads.

No Entry Barriers. A monopoly in a market in which entry is unlimited cannot be sustained for long. It is difficult to make a serious case that there are substantial entry barriers in Internet search. Web page indexing, the key input, is a product of computing horsepower and storage capacity. Both are commodities with steadily falling prices, per Moore’s law, in today’s economy. That Facebook has recently launched its own search product[10] says it all: entry into search only requires investment capital, which the antitrust laws rightfully do not regard as an entry barrier.

“Data” Is Not a Search Entry Barrier. Proponents of a Google prosecution argued that the demographic data assembled from Web searches is a barrier to entry. Yet data about consumer preferences and behavior is also a commodity. Whether credit and commercial transaction data via the “big three” reporting agencies, consumer satisfaction data from  J.C. Power or the emerging “big data” marketplace, data can easily be bought, in bulk, for cheap.[11] The corollary suggestion that economies of scale pose an insurmountable barrier to search entry represents an even more subtle concept which, unlike network effects, has not been recognized as a dispositive Section 2 factor — every large-scale business enjoys scale economies, after all.

C.        Exclusionary Practices

The proponents of an FTC case obviously did not make a credible showing that Google’s search practices meet the requisite tests for exclusionary conduct — competition on a basis other than efficiency or the predatory sacrifice of short-term profits.[12]  The failure was an analytical one, summed up with a Web ad running now, asking whether consumers can “trust” Google. Unfairness is a qualitative judgment that has nothing to do with current antitrust law. As the Supreme Court has written: “Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws; those laws do not create a federal law of unfair competition.”[13]

Search “Fairness” Is Not An Antitrust Obligation. The firms pushing for a prosecution contended that Google’s algorithms artificially lowered search results for specialized vertical rivals. Their theory that Web search has an inherent standard of fairness, something once called “search neutrality,” is epitomized by the name of the coalition that lobbied the FTC: FairSearch.org.

Dividing this issue into two parts, first consider whether such practices have an adverse effect on competition. Even if travel booking sites, for instance, compete with Google in search, there is no evidence that so-called link demotion diminishes their Web traffic. Some of these are the same companies that forecast Google would force them out of business but now boast of successful IPOs. Moreover, driving traffic to a website can easily be duplicated through other low-cost means, from email campaigns to QR codes.[14]

Second, consider whether there is a practical way to ferret out from Google’s constant tweaking of its algorithms which changes “demoted” quasi-search rivals. Since nearly everyone admits Google got to its present position by building a better search engine, the trade secret and IP consequences of such a monopolization theory are enforcement quicksand.

Most importantly, the changes Google makes to its search algorithms are designed to offer consumers a superior product. As Leibowitz summarized, “Google’s primary reason for changing the look and feel of its search results to highlight its own products was to improve the user experience.” [15] Where unilateral conduct exhibits such plausible efficiencies without evidence of substantial competitive harm, the exclusionary conduct element of a Section 2 case is not present.

Deception Without Much More Is Not Exclusionary. Former AAG Tom Barnett said in 2011 that the search firm acted anticompetitively because “Google’s display of search results is deceptive to users.”[16] Hardly. Although the Microsoft decision broke new legal ground in assessing when networks effects matter under Section 2, it did not create a “deception” prong of monopolization.[17] Lying may violate truth-in-advertising and consumer protection statutes, such as Section 5 of the FTC Act, but does not constitute anticompetitive conduct for Sherman Act purposes.

Use of Monopoly Power For “Leverage” Is Not Unlawful. A final problem with an FTC antitrust case was that it represented the discarded notion of monopoly leveraging. Vertical rivals like TripAdvisor and Kayak in reality compete with Google’s complementary content (e.g., Zagat and profiles) and sales (e.g., Google Checkout and ITA travel booking software) products. In other words, the claim is that Google uses its purported power in the search market to gain a competitive advantage in a second, different market. Of course, monopoly leveraging has been overruled as a stand-alone Section 2 violation.[18] Only if the competitive impact in the second market amounts to an attempt to monopolize is this sort of behavior illegal. It is impossible to conceive of an FTC complaint that could have credibly asserted there exists a “dangerous probability” Google would monopolize airline bookings, travel reviews or any other Internet content.

 E.         Durability

Consumer allegiance in technology is fleeting. The dramatically changed market positions of Myspace, Yahoo!, AOL and other, former online behemoths are the result of disruptive business models fueled by sweeping changes in underlying technology. No firm, including Google, is immune to such inflection points. With the accelerating substitution of apps, voice-response and social search (e.g., Apple’s Siri and Facebook’s Graph Search) — bolstered by evidence that in 2012, Google’s search advertising rates fell significantly for the first time[19] — there is little to suggest that any market power Google may hold exhibits the durability necessary for proof of monopoly power.[20]

F.         Remedy

Chairman Leibowitz noted that the complainants had asked to “regulate the intricacies of Google’s search engine algorithm.”[21] The evident implication is one of institutional competence. Just as the Microsoft court articulated a policy of avoiding extension of per se rules like tying to volatile technology markets,[22] the FTC was obviously worried that delving into the innards of Google’s “secret sauce” could do more bad than good.

There is ample basis for caution. Witness, for instance, the 1982 AT&T consent decree, which most knowledgeable observers conclude transformed the Antitrust Division from a litigation agency into a de facto telecommunications regulator. While the FTC is better-positioned institutionally to act as regulator, it nonetheless shares the same antitrust policy bias favoring what the late Judge Harold Greene famously called the “surer, cleaner” remedy of divestiture.[23]

It is true that in vertical mergers, the enforcement agencies have more recently fashioned consent decrees which impose behavioral conditions. Yet the deferential judicial oversight of merger settlements “leaves the issue of remedies as one where the antitrust agencies possess considerable discretion.”[24] That ambiguity has led former enforcement officials to bemoan the departure from a “law enforcement” antitrust model in favor of a regulatory one where “antitrust counselors find themselves focusing, not just on whether conduct contemplated by their clients is illegal,” but on what agencies are likely to seek in the nature of remedies.[25]

The late Judge Robert Bork and Prof. Greg Sidak have observed that “a mandate that Google provide its competitors access to the top Google search positions through antitrust injunction or consent decree would be virtually impossible to enforce.”[26] There are no neutral or objective criteria on which to assess the appropriate listing order of search results; by its very nature, Internet search is an effort to predict the information users are looking to obtain. “Rankings” of Web sites are based on a myriad of factors (reciprocal links, hits, metadata, etc.) that is the role of search engines to interpolate. To wade into the morass of regulating the operations of Google’s algorithms would place the FTC in the untenable position of deciding, as a legal matter, the business merits of nearly every change to the highly automated delivery of search results. As the Court empha­sized in Trinko, antitrust remedies are inappropriate if they require courts “to act as central planners, ident­ify­ing the proper price, quantity and other terms of dealing — a role for which they are ill suited.”[27] That is surely a recipe for subjectivity and ultimately disaster.

Conclusion

Unlike in the EU, a Federal Trade Commission decision not to institute enforcement action does not result in a formal opinion. That hinders exploration of the antitrust analysis utilized by the agency in closing its two-year monopolization investigation of Google. Decon­structing that analysis with informed inferences nonetheless reveals that the FTC faced a daunting task in seeking to hold Google accountable under Section 2. The decision to fold-up its tent represents an admirable instance of prosecutorial restraint by an agency that had been very publicly hounded by Google’s rivals.

* Glenn Manishin was counsel to MCI in the AT&T antitrust case and served as a principal lawyer for ProComp (AOL, Oracle, Sun, etc.) and several software trade associations in the Microsoft monopolization case. Manishin does not represent Google.


[1]  See Google Press Conference, Opening Remarks of FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz, Jan. 3, 2013, http://ht.ly/ j0vWQ (“Leibowitz Remarks”); In re Motorola Mobility LLC, a limited liability company, and Google Inc., a corporation, FTC File No. 121 0120 (Jan. 3, 2013), http://ht.ly/j0jcm.

[2] That search and search advertising may be considered portions of a “two-sided market,” in which search providers compete for advertisers by competing for search users, does little to alter the antitrust analysis, but underscores the lack of economic incentive for Google to alter search results as a means to foreclose competition. See Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does The Chicago School Teach About Internet Search And The Antitrust Treatment Of Google?, AEI (Oct. 2012), http://ht.ly/j0iUz (“Bork-Sidak”).

[3] Online Advertising Now Nearly 1/3rd of New York Times Revenue, The Awl, Oct. 10, 2010, http://ht.ly/j0j4w.

[4] Proposed Acquisition of Hellman & Friedman Capital Partners V, LP, (Click Holding Company) By Google Inc., File No. 071 0170, at 7 (FTC 2007) (“all online advertising does not constitute a relevant antitrust market”), http://ht.ly/j0jyz.

[5]  Id. at 13.

[6] Glenn Manishin, Off With Their Heads! The Fantasy Google Monopoly, Forbes, Feb. 3, 2012, http://ht.ly/j0kgZ.

[7] In re America Online, Inc., and Time Warner Inc., Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, File No. 001 0105, Docket No. C-3989, at 2 (FTC Dec. 14, 2000), http://ht.ly/j0kky.

[8] Bork-Sidak, supra note 2, at 6.

[9] E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).

[10] Facebook Delves Deeper Into Search, BusinessWeek, March 29, 2012, http://ht.ly/j0ky9.

[11] The acquisition of “big data” in today’s digital environment is relatively low cost due to massively scalable storage architecture.  See Amazon Debuts Low-Cost, Big Data Warehousing, InformationWeek, Nov. 28, 2012, http://ht.ly/j0lrZ; John Bantleman, The
Big Cost Of Big Data, Forbes, April 16, 2012, http://ht.ly/j0lB8.

[12] Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US 574, 589 (1986); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985).

[13] Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 US 209, 225 (2003) (citations omitted).

[14] Bork-Sidak, supra note 2, at 15.

[15] Leibowitz Remarks, supra note 1, at 5.

[16] Statement of Thomas O. Barnett before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy And Consumer Rights, at 6, Sept. 21, 2011, http://ht.ly/j0n8B.

[17] 253 F. 3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc). Microsoft was held liable under Section 2 for deceiving Java developers that programs written with Microsoft’s Java tools would be OS-indifferent. In reality, the Microsoft interface created Windows-only Java apps that would not run on any other platform, thus reinforcing the Windows desktop monopoly. No one argues that Google has tricked advertisers or search users into utilizing Google products when they thought they were creating a Google-free computing environment.

[18] Verizon Comms., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415 n.4 (2004).

[19] In the third quarter of 2012 Google’s AdWords prices fell by some 15%. Google Q3 Earnings Leak: $14.1 Billion, Disappoint Surprised Investors, Search Engine Land, Oct. 18, 2012, http://ht.ly/j0orI.

[20]  U.S. Department of Justice, Competition And Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 Of The Sherman Act, Chpt. 2 (2008), http://ht.ly/j0oCR (“Before subjecting a firm to possible challenge . . . for monopolization, the power in question is generally required to be much more than merely fleeting; that is, it must also be durable.”).

[21] Leibowitz Remarks, supra note 1, at 5.

[22] 253 F. 3d at 84.

[23] United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 168 & n.155 (D.D.C. 1982).

[24] Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger Review by the DOJ and the FCC, 61 Fed. Comm. L.J. 168, 190 (2005).

[25] A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, 10 Antitrust 13, 14 (1995).

[26] Bork-Sidak, supra note 2, at 4.

[27] Trinko, 540 U.S. 398.

A Vietnam of Internet Regulation

Given news that a European consortium of rivals has submitted yet another monopolization complaint against Google to the EU Commission, it is time to take stock of where we are in this long-running saga. A month ago the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) dropped its independent investigation, concluding that the facts did not support an antitrust prosecution of Google. Since then, the rhetoric from Google’s critics has reached absurd levels.

For instance, Bloomberg ran an editorial titled The FTC’s Missed Opportunity On Google. There the editors opined that “The FTC missed an opportunity to explore publicly one of the paramount questions of our day: is Google abusing its role as gatekeeper to the digital economy?” It is unfortunate that a leading American business publication could have so little understanding of competition policy and the role of antitrust law in policing the U.S. market economy. The editorial starts from an incorrect premise and proceeds to suggest, of all Luddite things, regulation of Internet search engines as “a public utility of sorts for e-commerce.” That’s obviously the theme of Google’s commercial rivals, but it’s neither correct nor appropriate.

Google-EU

Google’s alleged search dominance is hardly that of a gatekeeper. The fact is that Google neither acts like nor is sheltered from competition like the monopolists of the past, something the company’s critics never claim because they just can’t. Google succeeds only by running faster than its competitors. There’s nothing about Internet search that locks users into Google’s search engine or its many other products. Nor is new entry at all difficult. There are few, if any, scale economies in search and the acquisition of “big data” in today’s digital environment is relatively low cost, due to massively scalable storage architecture. Microsoft’s impressive growth of Bing in a mere three or so years shows that new competition in search can come at any time. Facebook’s recent, disruptive entry into search, leveraging its own trove of personalized user data, proves the point. As a result, Google remains surrounded by scores if not hundreds of competing providers of search, and succeeds relative to those rivals because its algorithms and search results are deemed superior (more accurate and useable) by Web patrons.

So what of this supposed “gatekeeper” role? North Korea is a gatekeeper to Internet content for its repressed citizens, but Google has none of that awesome economic and censorship power. If Google were really a search or Internet advertising monopolist, it would increase price like all classic monopolists, because monopoly power gives a firm the ability to do so. Yet Google search is a free product, supported by advertising. And that advertising is not priced by Google itself, rather through an auction among advertisers bidding on the use of search keywords. Google doesn’t control price, let alone raise prices. In fact, as its 2012 SEC filings admit, AdWords prices have fallen 15% in recent quarters.

The facts on the ground simply do not support the claim that Google’s search engine represents a bottleneck through which rivals must pass to gain website traffic. “Vertical” search competitors such as Yelp get nearly 50% of their traffic from smartphone apps, bypassing search engines, and thus Google, entirely. The only empirical data point supporting the Bloomberg thesis is that Web users tend to click much more on links displayed on the first or second pages of search results. But consumer inertia, lethargy or laziness doesn’t make Google itself any more powerful; and it certainly is no basis for antitrust intervention.

The call by the FTC to stay out of Internet search was a dispassionate end to a highly politicized investigation. Stripped of rhetoric, the Commission’s chairman, hardly a wallflower when it comes to aggressive enforcement, realized that the risk of transforming U.S. antitrust enforcers from prosecutors to regulators — something all knowledgeable antitrust lawyers regard as anathema — is very substantial in the area of Internet search. Search is inherently subjective, since its object is to produce results predicted to best satisfy a user’s interests. There is no objective standard against which to gauge the reliability, rank or relevance of Web sites in response to a search query. So putting Google under the antitrust lens for how it treats its own links versus so-called “organic” search results would embroil federal antitrusters in the Vietnam of Internet oversight, where ad hoc rules must be made up and the only way to “save” the search market would be to cripple the algorithms Google has used to make it the most popular search engine in the world. Further, treating Google as a public utility is nonsense in an era when even telephone and cable television companies, which have long-standing geographic exclusivities and control real bottleneck monopoly facilities, are no longer regulated as utilities.

Continue reading A Vietnam of Internet Regulation

Prudence Is The Right Answer To “Search Neutrality” Claims

Slippery slope

Politics is too often about making promises elected officials may be unable to (or even know they cannot) deliver. Yet where law enforcement is concerned — especially antitrust, which directly affects the economic future of our country — politics typically yields subjective and biased results. So it is with much irony that competitors of Google recently began a very public political offensive aimed at pressuring the Federal Trade Commission to sue the Web search giant for unlawful monopolization.

This is not the first such initiative, just the most unprincipled and wrong-headed. Citing anonymous sources, the Washington Post reported recently that the nearly two-year antitrust investigation by the FTC of competitor complaints against Google would end soon with a settlement “without addressing the most serious charge” of alleged “search bias.” Those same competitors have, in response, dramatically accused the FTC of abandoning its “institutional integrity” and begun actively shopping for a more receptive audience at the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, saying they “are losing faith that the FTC will act forcefully on their complaints.”

Every competition lawyer can repeat the maxim that the antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors. That means hitting competitors where it hurts is a good thing because it helps consumers. So media leaks, revealing that — despite a committed chairman and the hiring of a high-profile litigator to bring a case against Google to trial — the FTC uncovered no evidence that any “manipulation” of search results actually harmed consumers, are revealing. Revealing the absence of legitimate grounds to file a search monopolization case against Google, that is. A settlement that does not include restrictions on Google’s Web search activities is not one which fails to “address” that serious charge, however, but instead one that eschews politicized antitrust enforcement in favor of following the evidence. When there is no compelling proof of a legal violation, prosecutors should and, absent outside interference usually will, stand down.

This author has said before that the idea of “search neutrality” — positing some objective standard for search engine results — is an oxymoron and an invalid basis for antitrust liability. What the search complainants and their lawyers, like Silicon Valley’s outspoken Gary Reback, do not get is that governmental intervention in a dynamic, rapidly evolving industry, in which the dominant firm of today was hardly a speck merely a decade ago and has no power to force anyone to use its services, smacks of subjectivity. Are the antitrust lawyers and economists in the federal government supposed to function as a Federal Search Commission? Should the FTC ask federal judges and juries to determine when search result rankings are “fair” and, if so, how could anyone possibly make that determination?

Even apart from the reality that the settled legal elements of monopolization are totally absent when applied to Google (market share, monopoly power over prices, barriers to entry, network effects, etc.), that has always been the Achilles’ Heel of the complaining competitors like Yelp and their FairSearch.org coalition. Google’s search algorithms represent its secret sauce and crown jewels, the code that tumbled Yahoo and long-forgotten firms like Alta Vista from their perch as erstwhile Web search leaders. Looking under the search hood would effectively put the federal government in the position of confiscating, or at least deflating the value, of those trade secrets. To do so under the guise of “fairness” is doubly misguided; the Supreme Court has definitively ruled that firms have no duty of fairness nor to assist rivals, and that even the most malicious attacks against individual competitors do not, without adverse consequences to broader market competition, give rise to an antitrust offense.

The media reports indicating that its antitrust investigation found no evidence of consumer harm in search or search advertising simply show that the FTC has done the right thing. As FTC Commissioner Thomas Rosch remarked, it is “not embarrassing” for the agency to vote not to bring a case, because the commission is “just doing its job.” No amount of taunting from competitors will or can change that fact. Far from a cop out, this is what we pay these public officials to do, in a dispassionate and principled manner. Keeping an open mind until the facts are collected and sorted through is commendable for public law enforcement officials, the opposite of an abdication of responsibility.

In this context, turning to the Justice Department in the face of the FTC’s conclusions is unseemly. Justice reviewed and approved Google’s earlier acquisition of travel software provider ITA, imposing competition conditions but pointedly not accepting FairSearch’s claims that the antitrust laws compel search neutrality. The FTC and DOJ agreed that the former would conduct the broader federal investigation into Google’s search practices. Unlike the Microsoft antitrust case of 1998, where the FTC was frozen into inaction by a deadlock, here the FTC appears to have at least a majority, if not unanimity, against a monopolization prosecution. It is Mr. Reback and his clients who should be embarrassed by their brazen forum-shopping, not the FTC and its chairman, which have conducted a thorough and careful investigation. That competitors do not like the result is sour grapes, rather than a failure of will by the antitrust agencies. Governmental prudence toward search neutrality represents wisdom, not capitulation.

Glenn Manishin is an antitrust partner with Troutman Sanders in Washington, D.C. He represented MCI in the United States v. AT&T antitrust case and several competitive software trade associations in the United States v. Microsoft case. He does not represent Google.

Note: Reposted with permission from Law360.

 

FTC Overreaching And A Commentary Bitch-Slap

Googleopoly

Late Friday afternoon, several stories appeared quoting unnamed sources that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has received a staff memo recommending an antitrust prosecution of Google. Now, in a letter just days ago to FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz, Colorado Rep. Jared Polis — founder of bluemountain.com and ProFlowers.com — counseled that an FTC monopolization case against Google could lead to legislative blowback.

I believe that application of antitrust against Google would be a woefully misguided step that would threaten the very integrity of our antitrust system, and could ultimately lead to congressional action resulting in a reduction in the ability of the FTC to enforce critical antitrust protections in industries where markets are being distorted by monopolies or oligopolies.

Google Antitrust Action Could Cost FTC Power, Dem Warns | Law360. That’s consistent with what I suggested in my five-part series Why An FTC Case Against Google Is A Really Bad Idea, but of course goes even further as my legal analysis did not address potential political or legislative reaction to a formal FTC complaint.

Meanwhile, commentators are whacking each other silly.  Sam Gustin observed in TimeBusiness that “Microsoft and its anti-Google allies have spent untold millions waging an overt and covert campaign designed to persuade regulators to hobble the search leader. Perhaps if these companies spent a little less time complaining and a little more time innovating, they’d have a better chance of competing in the marketplace.” In response, John Paczkowski at AllThingsDigital noted the Polis letter’s “fortuitous timing” and implied that it “seems a bit odd” for a junior legislator to threaten a sitting FTC chairman, concluding that “maybe we should all wait and see the FTC’s evidence and the merits of its case — if there is one — before threatening to limit the agency’s authority.”

It is clear to any objective observer that there is a case in the works and that the FTC, which on background leaked that four of five commissioners are already on board, sent a trial balloon out through the press last week. Paczkowski is naive if he believes the timing of the stories last Friday was also not “fortuitous” or that the “merits” of the FTC’s case may not properly be a matter of policy and political debate. Having witnessed this same pas de deux for years in connection with United States v. Microsoft Corp., it’s just business as usual in Washington, DC. That may not make it right or courteous, but it does make it completely unexceptional.