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[This series of posts dissects the threatened FTC antitrust case against Google and concludes that a monopolization prosecution by the federal government would be a very bad idea. We divide the topic into five parts, one policy and four legal. Check out Part I, Part II and Part III.]
To make out a monopolization case, any plaintiff, FTC or otherwise, must not only show monopoly power in a relevant market, but also that anticompetitive practices led to (obtained) or protected (maintained) that power. Antitrust lawyers dub this the “conduct” element of Section 2. It’s what differentiates lawful monopolies, earned by innovation and business skill, from unlawful acts of monopolization.
Exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct — the terms are the same — is something other than competition on the merits. A colloquial definition which basically matches the judicial one is that anticompetitive conduct is business behavior that defeats competing firms on a basis other than efficiency. Likewise, conduct that sacrifices short-run profits in order to “recoup” those relative losses with higher future prices is not rational business behavior and is thus regarded by the law as presumptively predatory, the most egregious form of anticompetitive behavior.
4. Google Has Not Engaged In Exclusionary Practices
Try as they might, the proponents of an FTC case against Google have not made a credible showing anything Google has done meets these accepted tests for exclusionary conduct. The fallacy of their critique is summed up with a Web ad running now asking whether we can “trust” Google. Neither trust nor fairness have anything to do with the antitrust laws. Monopolization is not unfair competition, it is illegal competition.
Unfairness represents a qualitative judgment that has nothing to do with current antitrust law. As the modern Supreme Court has written:
Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws; those laws do not create a federal law of unfair competition or “purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against persons engaged in interstate commerce”…. The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the predator’s losses and to harvest some additional gain.
In sum, marketplace competition is not boxing and there are no Marquess of Queensberry Rules governing how firms must fight “fairly”. Anything goes in our market system so long as it pits product against product and is not illegal — in other words, so long as the challenged practices do not use the power of a monopoly position to drive out equally-efficient competitors.
Continue reading Why An FTC Case Against Google Is A Really Bad Idea (Part IV)
[This series of posts dissects the threatened FTC antitrust case against Google and concludes that a monopolization prosecution by the federal government would be a very bad idea. We divide the topic into five parts, one policy and four legal. Check out Part I.]
Section 2 of the 1890 Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2) makes “monopolization” unlawful. As every antitrust practitioner can recite by heart, this means that being a monopoly is not illegal, rather it is illegal to obtain or maintain monopoly power in a “relevant market” by exclusionary or anticompetitive means.
The most famous articulation of this basic principle comes from the case of United States v. Grinnell Corp. (“Grinnell“), 384 U.S. 563 (1966), in which the U.S. Supreme Court explained that a monopoly position reached as a result of a “superior product, business acumen or historic accident” is different from one achieved by the “willful acquisition or maintenance of that power.” That slightly schizophrenic approach reflects the basic conflict within antitrust itself. The law encourages, and permits, firms with market power (typically a synonym for monopoly power, although economists disagree at the margins) to compete aggressively on the merits, and even to eliminate competitors. Yet to tame the results of unbridled capitalism, Section 2 constrains companies from creating or defending monopoly power with anticompetitive practices.
2. Internet Search and Search Advertising are Not Relevant Antitrust Markets
The starting point for every antitrust case is market definition — outlining the contours of a market, in which the defendant participates, in order to assess whether the firm possesses monopoly power in that market. In defining the relevant antitrust market, courts determine which products compete with the defendant’s product and thus limit or prevent the exercise of market power. Typically, this process involves examining substitutability of products (both from a demand and a supply perspective) to find whether consumers and rivals could switch to another source (or sources) if the defendant firm were to raise price or restrict output. For example, in the 1950s chemical innovator duPont was charged with monopolizing the cellophane market, a product it invented, but the courts ruled that the relevant antitrust market could not be so narrowly limited because cellophane was interchangeable with other food wrapping materials. The “great sensitivity of customers in the flexible packaging markets to price or quality changes” prevented duPont from exerting monopoly control over price.
The more broadly the relevant antitrust market is defined, the less likely it is the defendant has the ability to exercise monopoly power in that market. As a corollary, if the targeted firm does not have monopoly power in the relevant market, there generally cannot be Section 2 liability. Many recent antitrust cases, including the FTC’s controversial attempt to block Whole Foods’ acquisition of Wild Oats and the Justice Department’s challenge to the Oracle-PeopleSoft merger, have turned on market definition.
With that background, let’s look at the purported “Internet search” market. That’s obviously the core proposition in any attack on Google for unlawful monopolization, because the necessary premise is that Google’s dominant share — estimated at from 65 to 80% — of Web searches is the foundation of its alleged monopoly. But here the antitrust analysis begins to break down. Internet search is a free product in which the consumers (Internet users) are charged nothing, with the service supported by advertising revenues. Since monopoly power is the “power to control price or exclude competition,” one must necessarily ask whether Google’s high “market share” reflects any market power at all. More importantly, search users are just like broadcast television viewers; they are an input into a different product — search advertising — in which consumers themselves are effectively sold by virtue of advertising rates based largely on impressions and click-throughs. Just as NBC, ABC, CBS and Fox compete for television eyeballs in order to sell more advertising (hence profiting) to sponsors, so too do Internet search engines monetize the service by selling eyeballs to advertisers.
Google’s share of search by itself is therefore almost meaningless. Even if the relevant market is confined to search, moreover, there is nothing that enables Google to prevent users from switching, instantaneously, to another of the scores of search engine providers on the Internet. (It should go without saying that even the government does not contend that Google displaced Yahoo!, Alta Vista, Ask.com and the many former search giants that dominated the Internet in the 1990s with anything other than better, more useful, search results, a consequence of better algorithms — the epitome of Grinnell’s “superior product.”) So the relevant market analysis must therefore focus on the area where Google in fact competes with other search engine providers, namely in the sale of search advertising. We all know that the links displayed alongside so-called “organic” search results are paid, listed conspicuously as “sponsored” results. Without search advertising, in today’s Internet economy there would be no free search engine services.
Continue reading Why An FTC Case Against Google Is A Really Bad Idea (Part II)
Folks in the tech industry have for the most part been conspicuously silent, at least publicly, about the Federal Trade Commission’s lengthy investigation of and apparent intention — perhaps as soon as year end — to file an antitrust case against Google for monopolization. In part that’s because Silicon Valley companies typically do not understand or want to get bogged down in legal and political controversies. In part, it’s because many tech innovators realize that staying part of Google’s AdWords ecosystem can be very profitable.
 This silence is not driven by fear of retaliation, as Google has never done that to its vertical channel partners or even erstwhile ex-corporate joint venturers like Apple and Yahoo!. But it is likely emboldening the FTC to think that the Washington, DC agency has the interests of competition in high-tech at heart in moving against Mountain View. That’s a disquieting conclusion which should be especially troubling to young Internet-centric companies from Facebook and Twitter to shoestring-funded app developers.
This series of posts dissects the threatened FTC case and concludes that a monopolization prosecution by the federal government of Google would be a very bad idea. We divide the topic into five parts, one policy and four legal. We’ll start with policy because that’s something which does not turn on the rather arcane elements of antitrust law.
Continue reading Why An FTC Case Against Google Is A Really Bad Idea (Part I)
So much media attention was paid to the spectacular collapse of U.S. Senate deliberations on a cybersecurity bill in August — and the Obama Administration’s controversial move to fashion an Executive Order on the subject — that few if anyone focused on the biggest change affecting the data protection landscape. The Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) guidelines on disclosure of cyber attacks by publicly traded corporations have become de facto rules for at least six companies, including Google Inc. and Amazon.com Inc., according to recent agency enforcement letters.
 Last fall, the SEC completed a long process of issuing staff “guidance” on when cybersecurity risks must be disclosed in public company securities filings (annual reports, 10Qs, etc.). The sensible conclusion was that if a hack or intrusion would be “material” to an ordinary investor, corporations need to disclose the cyber risk and discuss their actions to ameliorate or prevent it. Unlike Y2K, however, these guidelines, released by the SEC’s corporate finance section, did not come with a “safe harbor” for disclosing companies. In 1999, congressional legislation created a legal safety zone for Y2K disclosures, avoiding liability under the Securities Act of 1934, that has not been replicated with respect to more general cybersecurity risks.
The recent SEC enforcement steps also have taken place at the corporate finance division level, but presumably with the informal approval at least of SEC Chair Mary Schapiro. In these cases, the agency “requested” that a number of large Internet companies clarify or modify their SEC filings to disclose cyber incidents that previously had not been reported to investors. In April, the SEC asked Amazon to disclose in its next quarterly filing that hackers had raided its Zappos.com unit, stealing addresses and some credit card digits from 24 million customers in January, which Amazon did. Google likewise agreed in May to put a previously disclosed cyber atack in its formal earnings report. AIG, Hartford Financial Services Group, Eastman Chemical and Quest Diagnostics were also asked to improve disclosures of cyber risks, according to agency staff correspondence reported by Bloomberg News.
As one example, here is the relevant excerpt from the corporate finance staff’s May 2, 2012 letter to Google CEO Larry Page:
We note your disclosure that if your security measures are breached, or if your services are subject to attacks that degrade or deny the ability of users to access your products and services, your products and services may be perceived as not being secure, users and customers may curtail or stop using your products and services, and you may incur significant legal and financial exposure. We also note your Current Report on Form 8-K filed January 13, 2010 disclosing that you were the subject of a cyber attack. In order to provide the proper context for your risk factor disclosures, please revise your disclosure in your next quarterly report on Form 10-Q to state that in the past you have experienced attacks. Please refer to the Division of Corporation Finance’s Disclosure Guidance Topic No. 2 at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm for additional information.
The difference between fall 2011 and spring 2012 is that, irrespective of the formal legal effect of staff guidance, the SEC is using its administrative processes to produce a disclosure result not specifically compelled by the agency’s rules for corporate securities filings. That in itself is not surprising, since the securities laws and implementing SEC regulations are broad enough to encompass any factor, whether financial or otherwise, that could affect stock prices. Here, the SEC staff opined in its guidance that basic SEC rules about market manipulation, insider trading and misleading shareholders (e.g., Rule 10b-5) required disclosure of cyber incidents and cybersecurity risks by any business potentially affected by hacking. And that’s obviously not confined to online retailers or Web-centric businesses.
The bigger question is how businesses can protect themselves from the embarrassment of such compelled, government-mandated cyber disclosures and the even greater potential for fines and formal enforcement actions the SEC may utilize in the IT security realm going forward. Here are a few pointers:
- Do not assume that merely because your business is not online, cybersecurity cannot affect the company. Hundreds of “brick and mortar” retailers, for instance, have had consumer credit card records breached.
- Treat data security just like your securities lawyers treat any other risk to the business’s future, since that is how federal regulators view cyber risks.
- Do not assume the SEC’s focus on cybersecurity is limited to public companies, because the underlying rules cited by its corporate finance division apply just as much to private placements as they do to proxy solicitations and 10K reports.
- When disclosing IT security risks, make sure they are balanced by something concrete and proactive to prevent, or diminish the severity of, cyber attacks. Otherwise diclosures may have the opposite effect of encouraging shareholder class action litigation.
- Work closely with compliance counsel, IT technology experts and your insurance carriers to develop workable cybersecurity assessment and intrusion notification regimes, internally and externally. This should not only reduce legal exposure, but going forward lower the company’s costs for cyber insurance. Periodic outside reviews should provide both comfort and legal protection to CEOs or CFOs signing SEC submissions.
These SEC staff actions were balanced by the traditional caveat that “our comments or changes to disclosure in response to our comments do not foreclose the Commission from taking any action with respect to the company or the filings and the company may not assert staff comments as a defense in any proceeding initiated by the Commission or any person under the federal securities laws of the United States.” But the chances the full SEC would prosecute a public company for following staff suggestions are remote. On the other hand, for public corporations that ignore this lesson, and fail to disclose cybersecurity risks, we suspect only pain and expense — most likely in a Commission prosecution or fine — lie in their SEC futures. So rules are really rules, even when they are not.
Note: Originally written for and reposted with permission of my law firm’s Information Intersection blog.
In a post about Twitter several weeks back, I concluded that “[a] threat of government action can be just as debilitating to innovation as premature enforcement intervention into the marketplace.” Although the subject then was vertical integration, the same is true of broader antitrust issues, like mergers, and tech policy issues such as privacy. When the rules are ambiguous, and enforcement discretion allows for a wide range of subjective governmental decisions, uncertainty breeds business timidity because rivals can game the process.
A Wall Street Journal opinion piece by L. Gordon Crovitz on Monday made this same point. Commenting that Google’s proposed acquisition of travel guide publisher Frommer’s could disrupt the travel market even further (as Dan also covered on DisCo) — and reacting to all-too-typical calls by Google’s competitors for “close” Federal Trade Commission review of the deal — Crovitz wrote:
As a regulatory matter, there is real risk that the current antitrust review by the FTC will block innovation in the search industry. The agency could freeze Google into its historic way of doing business by stopping it from delivering answers directly (removing the consumer benefit) and by banning acquisitions such as Frommer’s…. For the technology companies that are supposed to be the drivers of our economy, this kind of regulatory uncertainty is a growing burden. The response to innovation by one company should be more innovation by others, not competitors calling in lawyers and lobbyists.
The FTC’s Threat to Web Consumers | WSJ.com.
Could not have said it better myself!
Note: Originally prepared for and reposted with permission of the Disruptive Competition Project.
We’ve written previously about the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) being limited by judicial interpretation, especially for employers as civil plaintiffs, and offered tips on alternatives to controlling unauthorized access to or use of enterprise IT systems by employees. Reports Of The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act’s Demise Have Been Greatly Exaggerated | Information Intersection. The terrain is getting even murkier.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit last April in Nosal gave the statute a limited construction, holding that the “exceeds authorized access” offense is “limited to violations of restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its use.” That may make sense from the perspective of a law dating to 1984 and initially designed to criminalize physical damage to computing systems, but not from the perspective of how courts transition precedent from one technical era into another. The CFAA is not that old. Yet already we are confronted with an increasing conflict as to its basic scope when applied to civil remedies for insiders who exceed their authority and injure corporate good will or IP. Indeed, cybersecurity experts often warn that the greatest threats to business IT systems and the information they store arise not from hackers, but dishonest or disaffected employees, even “well-meaning insiders.”
Last week the Fourth Circuit added more fuel to the CFAA fire in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, extending Nosal to civil claims and concluding that the law does not codify violations of corporate information technology policies. The employer’s IT policy (as this blog recommended) prohibited employees from using company information without authorization and from downloading information to their personal computers. So was use of information in violation of that policy, but obtained from a computer an employee is otherwise authorized to access, “without authorization” or “exceed[ing] authorized access”?
The WEC Carolina court said no. Unauthorized access applies to an employee who has “approval to access a computer, but uses his access to obtain or alter information that falls outside the bounds of his approved access…. Notably, neither of these definitions extends to the improper use of information validly accessed.” They do not cover information misuse alone, the court reasoned, because as a criminal statute the CFAA must be construed in accordance with the plain meaning of its language so defendants have fair warning about punishable conduct. The Fourth Circuit also rejected the “cessation-of-agency” theory espoused by the Seventh Circuit. Under this theory, if as an employee you use a corporate computer network in breach of your company’s policy, you have violated your fiduciary duty and therefore any right of access is terminated by operation of law, making ongoing use of the network a violation of the CFAA. The Fourth Circuit held that this approach would improperly suck in “millions of ordinary citizens” who innocently check Facebook or sporting event scores while at work.
Our conclusion here likely will disappoint employers hoping for a means to rein in rogue employees. But we are unwilling to contravene Congress’s intent by transforming a statute meant to target hackers into a vehicle for imputing liability to workers who access computers or information in bad faith, or who disregard a use policy. Providing such recourse not only is unnecessary, given that other legal remedies exist for these grievances, but also is violative of the Supreme Court’s counsel to construe criminal statutes strictly.
The ambiguities inherent in the often-amended CFAA are growing as aggressive litigants vie for competing interpretations. They expose the often-secret reality that the statute was not structured for an era when most employees have company-issued computing devices and are permitted remote BYOD access to corporate IT systems. The argument that the CFAA regulates the workplace today because everyone uses what the statute classifiues as “protected computers” (used in interstate commerce, i.e., with an Internet connection) is on its last legs. We do suspect that the wide gulf among the federal appellate courts may inspire the Supreme Court to take up a CFAA case next term, which begins in October 2012, but even if review is accepted a decision would likely not be handed down until 2013 or even 2014. Employers obviously cannot wait that long and, given political paralysis on cubersecurity in the Senate, a legislative clarification seems extremely unlikely.
The lesson: employers should keep tabs on the CFAA, but put more of their IT and IP protection ”eggs” into confidentiality agreements, NDAs and other “baskets” that do not raise the linguistic disputes and uncertainty plaguing civil CFAA litigation today.
Note: Originally written for and reposted with permission of my law firm’s Information Intersection blog.
With calls for elimination of the U.S. penny going back decades, we are now on the verge of an inflection point for commercial payments. Between debit cards and emerging mobile payment systems, it seems innovation can disrupt even established roles of government that date to the U.S. Constitution (1789) and centuries beforehand.
Cash moved one small step nearer to its deathbed with the announcement on Wednesday that Square, the mobile payments start-up, would partner with Starbucks Coffee Company, reports Claire Cain Miller on Wednesday in The New York Times.
Daily Report: A Step Forward for the Mobile Wallet.
Social security checks are today almost completely a thing of the past. How many more years or decades before currency itself becomes extinct? And will this sea of change also disintermediate banks? Wait and see, but likely not for long.
Note: Originally prepared for and reposted with permission of the Disruptive Competition Project.
The battle to beat Google’s Android mobile phone OS is quickly turning into a legal bonanza. Apple is suing HTC, Samsung and Motorola, all makers of wireless phones with the Android platform. Oracle is seeking up to $6.1 billion in a patent lawsuit against Google, alleging Android infringes Oracle’s Java patents. And Microsoft is suing Motorola over its Android line.
That’s all perfectly fine from an antitrust and competition standpoint — leaving aside the harder policy question of whether using patent infringement litigation to block competition should be permissible. Enforcing property rights is a legitimate and rational business activity that, absent “sham” lawsuits, is not second-guessed by antitrust enforcement agencies or courts. There can be exclusionary consequences, but they are a result of the patent laws in the first instance, not of themselves anything anticompetitive by the patent holder.
A much more troubling aspect of the increasing IP (or “IPR” as they say across the pond) battles surrounding Android is the recent sale of Nortel’s 6,000 or so wireless patents at a bankruptcy auction in Canada to a collection of bidders including Apple, Microsoft, RIM, EMC, Ericsson and Sony. How Apple Led The High-Stakes Patent Poker Win Against Google, Sealing Ballmer’s Promise | TechCrunch. The winning consortium bid more than $4.5 billion — some five times Google’s opening bid and, according to some pundits, far more than the portfolio was worth — to gain control of the patents.
“Why is the portfolio worth five times more to this group collectively than it is to Google?” said Robert Skitol, an antitrust lawyer at the Drinker Biddle firm. “Why are three horizontal competitors being allowed to collaborate and cooperate and join hands together in this, rather than competing against each other?”
Antitrust Officials Probing Sale of Patents to Google’s Rivals | Washington Post.
These are good questions. Patent “pools,” which are collections of horizontal competitors sharing patent licenses among themselves, are today generally considered procompetitive under the antitrust laws where they (a) are limited to technologically essential or “blocking” patents, and (b) do not contain ancillary restraints, such as resale price-setting or restrictions on participant use of alternative technologies. (MPEG, WiFi, LTE and other communications technologies are prime examples of patent pools.) The theory is that, with price effects eliminated, the cross-licensing of patents that might otherwise be used to block entry into a market reduces barriers to entry and increases efficiency.
 Yet the consortium which won the Nortel wireless portfolio, revealing dubbed “Rockstar Bidco,” includes nearly everyone in the mobile phone and wireless OS businesses except Google. If these players agreed among themselves not to license their own patents to Google, that would be a per se illegal group boycott (also known as a concerted horizontal refusal to deal). Competitors cannot allocate markets or conspire to keep a rival out of the marketplace. It is unclear whether Google was invited to join Rockstar Bidco, but unless Larry, Sergey and Eric turned down such an offer, it seems a fair case can be made that the consortium bid was in effect an implicit horizontal agreement not to include Google. Post-auction, the reality of licenses will clearly tell us whether the joint ownership structure was a pretext to cover a refusal to deal. No one knows what the consortium intends to do with the Nortel patent portfolio; they won’t say. Microsoft, RIM And Partners Mum On Plans For Nortel Patents | Forbes.
This author happens not to be a fan of Android; I’m a very happy iPhone user since day one of the Apple wireless revolution. This does not mean, though, that I can agree with a business strategy in which all of the other players in the mobile phone industry gang up on Google. (It is unclear were Nokia fits into all of this, but given the steadily decreasing share for its Symbian OS, I suspect the inclusion or not of Nokia will not be dispositive.)
The antitrust issue this presents is a thorny one, which frequently comes up in connection with trade associations and technical standards. When competitors collaborate, is under-inclusiveness or over-inclusiveness worse? Which is the bigger threat to competition? That is, if a trade group opens a collective buying consortium, for instance, is it better from an antitrust perspective to require that it be open to all — so that some rivals are not deprived of the scale economies — or that the consortium includes less than all firms in the market — so that competition in purchasing will drive down input prices?
Another concern is that, by excluding Google, the Rockstar consortium allows the other competitors to utilize the patents without paying license fees (since they now own them), leaving Google alone to need licenses for its Android OS. Does Nortel Patent Sale Make Google An Antitrust Victim? | TechFlash. That is a variant of “raising rivals’ costs” (here one rival only), which has over the past three decades become a recognized basis for assessing the anticompetitive nature of unilateral, single-firm conduct. When a group includes horizontal competitors who collectively control a huge share of the market, raising rivals’ costs supplies the anticompetitive “purpose or effect” needed to make out a rule of reason antitrust claim, even if the group boycott concern is misplaced or ameliorated. Here the intent to slow down Android is clear; whether that is anticompetitive, exclusionary or not is more ambiguous. Apple, Microsoft Patent Consortium Trying to Kill Android | eWeek.com.
There are precious few judicial decisions in this area and the IP licensing guidelines from DOJ/FTC do not really speak to the question. For that reason alone, the Rockstar Bidco venture, in my view, merits a very close look by the U.S. competition agencies. Allowing Google’s mobile phone competitors to do indirectly, with joint patent ownership, what they could not do indirectly, by agreeing not to license to Google, would be an incongruous result. On the other hand, a remedy may be worse than the harm. In standards, for example, it is often the case that antitrust risks are mitigated by requiring the holder of an essential patent to agree to so-called FRAND licensing (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions). That’s an appropriate remedy where under-inclusiveness is the problem, so long as there’s a market measure for a “fair” license (royalty) price. Where the licensor, as in this instance, is everyone except the licensee, I for one fear there would be no objective way to assess whether license rates were reasonable.
 DOJ's Christine Varney The lack of an effective remedy for a competition problem does not, of course, require that the transaction involved be blocked. At the same time, where a problem cannot be fixed, that is a good enforcement policy reason not to allow the structural market conditions giving rise to the issue in the first place. Put another way — a slight modification of an old aphorism — if there’s no remedy, maybe there should be no right. Whether the viability of the Rockstar consortium is decided by outgoing Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney or her September successor, the forthcoming answer should be interesting.
If you’re read my The Law of Social Media essays or presentations, you probably know there have been few serious cases yet establishing law specifically targeting social media. One can apply basic principles to predict what courts will do, but so far there are only a handful of reported decisions that say anything at all about social media.
That does not mean nothing happened in 2010 in this rapidly evolving area. In my view, the most important developments are reflected in these four cases:
1. The Food & Drug Administration’s citation of Novartis for Facebook content that lacked required pharmaceutical side-effect warnings and disclaimers, and the agency’s subsequent delay in release of social media “guidance” for pharma until Q1 2011. The case illustrates that heavily regulated industries face special risks and burdens in structuring social media marketing campaigns.
2. The assertion of jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Board over “protected activity” of employees (discussing working conditions, for instance) on Facebook, even where the company is not unionized. This shows that, although equal employment issues still dominate employers’ use of social media in hiring and firing, there may be limits to which companies can penalize workers for their social media posts if the content is work-related.
3. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., reversing the older, black-letter rule that employees have no privacy interests at all in employer-provided email systems.
4. The decision just days ago by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit in United States v. Warshak, holding that the 20-year old Stored Communications Act’s approval of warrantless seizure by the government of user emails is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. This is the first judicial opinion that extends “reasonable expectations of privacy” from snail mail and the telephone to email, using a principled and thoughtful constitutional analysis.
Since the advent of email, the telephone call and the letter have waned in importance, and an explosion of Internet-based communication has taken place. People are now able to send sensitive and intimate information, instantaneously, to friends, family, and colleagues half a world away. Lovers exchange sweet nothings, and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all with the click of a mouse button. Commerce has also taken hold in email. Online purchases are often documented in email accounts, and email is frequently used to remind patients and clients of imminent appointments.
In short, “account” is an apt word for the conglomeration of stored messages that comprises an email account, as it provides an account of its owner’s life. By obtaining access to someone’s email, government agents gain the ability to peer deeply into his activities. . . . If we accept that an email is analogous to a letter or a phone call, it is manifest that agents of the government cannot compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of an email without triggering the Fourth Amendment.
And as my friends at SiliconANGLE have observed, the same rationale should apply as well to emails stored in “the cloud” or other Web-based email systems, like Gmail and Hotmail.
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So there you have ’em. Not quite as interesting as the worst-dressed actress and best cinema films lists we’ll see over the next few days, but (perhaps) a bit more relevant to our daily activities on social networks and the real-time Web.
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October 8th, 2012 | 
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